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I.	  Introduction	  
 
“This morning, I thought ‘send her home knowing nothing- what I know will destroy this 
girl. I don’t want to scare her.’”1 
 This quote was one I heard from an interviewee while I was conducting funded 
research in Bosnia-Herzegovina from May to July 2014. She was referring to the first 
thoughts she had on the morning of our interview, and how she was afraid that I would be 
devastated by the horrors she had endured during the war from 1992-1995. This quote 
would set the tone of my research, which looked at post-conflict peacebuilding 
mechanisms in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH). My research was informed by the long, 
tumultuous history of BiH, which highlights the importance of understanding the past in 
order to fully understand the present. The war in BiH was one of a series of secessionist 
wars that tore apart the former Yugoslavia, and resulted in the declaration of 
independence by all six republics within the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia. 
BiH declared independence from the Republic in 1992, and as a result, neighboring 
Serbia saw an opportunity to invade Bosnia and declare its territory part of a “Greater 
Serbia.”2  
Before the war, BiH was a multiethnic state, composed of Muslim Bosniaks, 
Catholic Croats, and Orthodox Serbs. This made it all the more shocking when a central 
component of Serbia’s invasion was a bloody ethnic cleansing campaign against Muslim 
Bosniaks within BiH. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 All names have been changed to protect identity of participants. All quotes are excerpts from 
interviews conducted by the author from May to July 2014 in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Respondent 
pseudonyms will be followed by gender, age, and occupation. This quote: Samra, female, 31, 
project assistant in tourist office. 
2 “Bosnian Genocide,” History Channel, accessed March 20, 2015, 
http://www.history.com/topics/bosnian-genocide. 
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(ICTY) estimates the total number of casualties to be over 100,000, making it the most 
violent event Europe had experienced since World War II.3 The war finally ended in 
November 1995 with the signing of the Dayton Accords, which managed to stop the 
immediate violence, but ultimately froze the ethno-religious divisions in BiH.  
Today, Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks still remain divided both socially and 
politically. Dayton “was a formula to end the war, for conflict management rather than 
creating a self-sustaining form of peace,” as it divided BiH into the Bosniak-Croat 
federation, “which controls 51 per cent of the single geographical region of the state of 
Bosnia, and the Republika Srpska, which controls the other 49 per cent.”4 Rather than 
resolving tensions, Dayton ended up institutionalizing them – the treaty even put in place 
three presidents, one from each ethno-religious group, who take turns rotating 
presidential duties.  
These ethno-religious groups are increasingly segregated and the fact that each 
group feels they “lost” the war in 1995 only increases the risk of future conflict. Although 
this does not necessarily mean an imminent civil war, it does increase tensions and set the 
stage for lower intensity conflicts that would still be damaging. Conflicting 
interpretations of what happened from 1992-1995 and why it happened continue to 
poison inter-ethnic relations between Bosnian communities. Successful and effective 
peacebuilding mechanisms are essential to creating a stable future for BIH and preventing 
its relapse into another conflict. If such a conflict were to erupt, the potential for a 
domino effect on other Eastern European countries would make an impact across the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Jan Zwierzchowski and Ewa Tabeau, “The 1992-95 War in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Census-
Based Multiple System Estimation of Casualties’ Undercount” (Conference Paper for the 
International Research Workshop on “The Global Costs of Conflict,” Berlin, 2 February 2010), 2.  
4 Oliver P. Richmond and Jason Franks, Liberal Peace Transitions: Between Statebuilding and 
Peacebuilding (Edinburgh, GBR: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 54. 
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globe - which is why it is infinitely better to work towards prevention now, rather than 
conflict resolution later.  
 For the purposes of this thesis, I will seek to answer a primary and secondary 
research question. The primary research question, addressed in the first chapter, focuses 
on the state level and asks: How successful have peacebuilding strategies been in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina? I will argue that peacebuilding mechanisms in BiH have been 
largely unsuccessful, as they have been unable to meet three key indicators for success - 
pursuit of rehabilitation, reconstruction, and reconciliation; creation of political and 
socio-economic mechanisms that build trust; and external intervention that helps create 
peace and stability. The secondary research question, addressed in the second chapter, 
focuses on the individual level and asks: How have these peacebuilding strategies met 
the expectations and needs of the citizens in Bosnia-Herzegovina? I will argue that as a 
result of peacebuilding mechanisms being unsuccessful, they also have not met the needs 
and expectations of the citizens of BiH.  
II.	  Literature	  Review	  
 
The evolution of peacebuilding, which Paris calls “the global experiment in post-
conflict peacebuilding” has been “underway since the end of the Cold War,” yet the 
concept itself continues to be an issue of modern debate.5 Peacebuilding, or “what 
happens when the guns fall silent,” as stated by Francis, is “still a markedly under-
researched area of study. Despite the intensity, scale, and diversity of interventions to end 
bloody civil wars and rebuild the peace, there is still limited understanding of what 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Roland Paris, “Saving Liberal Peacebuilding,” in When War Ends: Building Peace Divided 
Communities, ed. David J. Francis (Farnham, Surrey, GBR: Ashgate Publishing Group, 2012), 
27.  
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actually happens when the shooting stops.”6 Due to this limited understanding, there is 
frequent debate among scholars over the different schools of thought in understanding 
peacebuilding and its practices.  The pros and cons of different types of peacebuilding, as 
well as the intentions and interests behind the variety of actors, can be best shown 
through four different lenses – liberal, critical, transformatory, and realist. Each lens has 
different criteria for evaluating the “success” of peacebuilding mechanisms, which will 
be analyzed in the research design and methodology section.  
The most dominant school of thought in the field is the concept of “liberal 
peacebuilding,” which is a corollary of the well-known democratic peace theory. The 
liberal peace hypothesis, as described by Newman, “is premised upon the idea that 
democracy and a free economy encourage people to resolve and express their differences 
peacefully and that this is the best foundation for development and acceptable 
governance.”7 Although debate over the pros and cons of liberal peacebuilding is 
rampant, most scholars agree that liberal peacebuilding has been used in nearly every 
intervention since Boutros Boutros-Ghali first defined peacebuilding in An Agenda for 
Peace in 1992.8 Francis notes, “It is important to stress that despite the diversity, large 
scope and range of peacebuilding activities and interventions, there is a predominant 
emphasis on neoliberal political and economic policies…hence the label ‘liberal 
peacebuilding.’”9 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 David J. Francis, When War Ends: Building Peace in Divided Communities (Farnham, Surrey, 
England: Ashgate, 2012), 1. 
7 Edward Newman, “‘Liberal’ peacebuilding debates” in New Perspectives on Liberal 
Peacebuilding, ed. Edward Newman, Roland Paris, and Oliver P. Richmond (Tokyo: United 
Nations University Press, 2009), 39. 
8 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-
keeping (New York: Report of the Secretary General, UN Doc A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June 1992). 
9 Francis, When War Ends, 5. 
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Paris seeks to explain the prevalence of liberal peacebuilding by linking it to 
globalization. Paris says the “the globalization of a particular model of domestic 
governance – liberal market democracy” is moving “from the ‘core’ to the ‘periphery’ of 
the international system.”10 This type of globalization is not cultural nor is it of specific 
goods or services, but is rather the globalization of a norm, “of the very idea of what a 
state should look like and how it should act.”11 The most common criticism of liberal 
peacebuilding, as stated by Francis, is the fact that it often “inherently ignores the local 
context and ownership of the complex and long-term process of winning the peace and 
reconciling divided communities.”12  
 The “critical” school of thought regarding peacebuilding takes such criticisms to 
the furthest end of the spectrum. Newman defines the critical approach to peacebuilding 
as one that draws upon critical and international relations theory as it “raises questions 
about existing policy assumptions concerning, for example, the market, democracy, 
governance, capacity-building, and modernization.”13 As Mansfield and Snyder discern, 
“Pushing countries too soon into competitive electoral politics not only risks stoking war, 
sectarianism and terrorism, but it also makes the future consolidation of democracy more 
difficult” – meaning that imposing the liberal peacebuilding theory can often cause more 
harm than good.14  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Roland Paris, “Echoes of the Mission Civilisatrice: Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era” in 
The United Nations and human security, ed. Edward Newman and Oliver P. Richmond 
(Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001), 100. 
11 Paris, “Echoes of the Mission Civilisatrice,” 101. 
12 Francis, When War Ends, 9. 
13 Francis, When War Ends, 9.   
14 Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Prone to Violence: The Paradox of the Democratic 
Peace,” The National Interest (Michigan: Gale Group, 2005), 39.  
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The idea that liberal peacebuilding has a reverse effect on war-shattered states – 
destabilizing societies, exacerbating tensions, and potentially causing future conflict - can 
be seen as the emerging “hyper-critical school” of scholars who believe liberal 
peacebuilding is “fundamentally destructive or illegitimate.” Hyper-critics can even go so 
far as to portray peacebuilding operations as “a form of Western or liberal imperialism 
that seeks to exploit or subjugate the societies hosting the missions.”15 David states, “The 
concept of peacebuilding holds much promise” but can “engender perverse effects to the 
point of jeopardizing the peace it assumes has been achieved.”16  
The remaining lenses used to view peacebuilding can be classified as 
transformatory and realist. Transformatory peacebuilding “emphasizes the resolution of 
conflict, which may include addressing underlying sources of violence. This approach is 
premised upon the assumption that durable peace and stability rest upon the achievement 
of positive peace and giving free expression to local voices, desires and forms of 
politics.”17 Lederach describes this process as “conflict transformation,” which “views 
peace as centered and rooted in the quality of relationships.”18 Rather than a static 
process that has a beginning and an end, Lederach sees conflict transformation (and 
transformatory peacebuilding) as a “phenomenon that is simultaneously dynamic, 
adaptive, and changing.”19 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Roland Paris, “Saving Liberal Peacebuilding,” 28. 
16 C. David, “Does peacebuilding build peace? Liberal (mis) steps in the peace process,” Security 
Dialogue 30, No. 1 (1999), 26,29.  
17 Newman, “‘Liberal’ peacebuilding debates,” 47. 
18 John Paul Lederach, “Conflict Transformation,” in Beyond Intractability, ed. Guy Burgess and 
Heidi Burgess (University of Colorado, Boulder: Conflict Information Consortium, October 
2003), 3. 
19 Lederach, “Conflict Transformation,” 4.  
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Realist peacebuilding, on the other hand, “entails containing or repressing conflict 
in the interests of international peace and stability in general or particular hegemonic 
interests. Although it may use the language of peace, this approach is primarily 
concerned with international systemic stability.”20 This “Hobbesian” vision does not seek 
to address root causes, nor does it prioritize participatory government. Contemporary 
peacebuilding, Newman argues, “is characterized more by realist and liberal- of the 
hegemonic variety- rather than transformatory or Wilsonian liberal approaches.”21 
Whether or not this was the case in terms of peacebuilding in Bosnia-Herzegovina will be 
analyzed later on in this thesis.  
III.	  Research	  Questions	  
 
My primary research question, addressed in the first chapter, focuses on the state 
level and asks: How successful have peacebuilding strategies been in Bosnia-
Herzegovina? My research will seek to complement other global studies on 
peacebuilding with an innovative study specific to BiH. The conflict is fairly recent, and 
is located in a part of the world often overlooked by the media. Conflicts and 
peacebuilding in the Middle East tend to receive the most media attention because of 
their location to strategic resources, and thus their international relevance. It is more 
difficult to find material about BiH or the Balkan region in Western media, and I am 
hoping to draw attention to an area where peacebuilding mechanisms may not have 
achieved the desired outcomes. Once the war and peacekeeping operation ceased, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Newman, “‘Liberal’ peacebuilding debates,” 48.  
21 Newman, “‘Liberal’ peacebuilding debates,” 50. 
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relatively limited media attention on BiH dropped off entirely, and the subsequent failure 
of the peacebuilding operation was ignored. 
 My secondary research question, addressed in the second chapter, focuses on the 
individual level and asks: How have these peacebuilding strategies met the expectations 
and needs of the citizens in Bosnia-Herzegovina? To answer this follow-up question, I 
will analyze the interviews I conducted with local citizens during my time in BiH from 
May – July 2014. The local perspective helps to gauge the success of peacebuilding 
mechanisms at the individual level, and can show if mechanisms imposed at the 
government or international levels have filtered down to the citizens. The interview data 
will also show which expectations and needs the citizens prioritize, and whether or not 
the state institutions meet these priorities. The modern-day struggles of the citizens, as a 
result of their government failing to meet their needs, should be garnering media 
attention. However, people assume that the Dayton Accords (and Western intervention) 
ended the violence, so they believe that there is nothing more to be done in BiH. In 
reality, I argue that this assumption is not only unfounded but is dangerous to the future 
of BiH, which needs more effective peacebuilding mechanisms to create long-term 
stability.  
The wider significance of this research is to contribute to the field of 
peacebuilding. As mentioned, there are significantly more peacebuilding studies that have 
been conducted on peacebuilding in Western countries (i.e., Northern Ireland) or areas of 
international importance (i.e., the Middle East), but comparatively less on BiH. While 
some academics have noted BiH was a “mixed success,” or used it as an example of what 
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not to do in a peacebuilding operation, few have looked at how to reverse these wrongs.22 
I hope to use my research findings to not only draw lessons that can be applied to other 
conflicts worldwide, but also to help contribute to a new peacebuilding strategy in BiH.   
By incorporating my personal fieldwork and research, I hope to add a new perspective on 
peacebuilding in BiH to the broader literature of peace studies. I was able to fully 
immerse myself in the lifestyle and culture of BiH, and through participant observation 
and semi-structured interviews, was able to get a strong idea of how these two research 
questions should be addressed.  
IV.	  Research	  Design	  and	  Methodology	  
 
Before seeking to address either of my research questions, there are a couple key 
terms that need to be defined and operationalized. To start, there are entire articles written 
on the problems that arise from defining “peacebuilding.” One of the primary issues is 
the confusion over the distinction between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. These terms 
are not to be used interchangeably, as they have different timelines, goals, and purposes 
in conflict societies. Peacekeepers serve to, quite literally, “keep the peace” in a post-
conflict society immediately after a treaty or peace agreement has been signed. 
Peacebuilding occurs after peacekeeping ends, when the society is (relatively) stable, and 
peacebuilding mechanisms can be used to prevent a society from relapsing into future 
conflict. However, the term has “remained a largely amorphous concept without clear 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Theodora-Ismene Gizelis and Kristen E. Kosek, “Why Humanitarian Interventions Succeed or 
Fail: The Role of Local Participation,” in Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic 
International Studies Association 40, No. 4 (2005).  
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guidelines or goals” and the lack of agreement leads to a lack of coordination, as well as 
confusion over when and how peacebuilding should be conducted.23  
According to C. David, peacebuilding “is an elastic concept” that “may be 
broadly or narrowly defined,” but is generally regarded to have three central elements.24 
These elements include:  
“1. The rehabilitation, reconstruction and reconciliation of societies that have 
 suffered the ravages of armed conflict; 
2. The creation of the security-related, political and/or socio-economic 
 mechanisms needed to build trust between the parties and prevent the resumption 
 of violence;  
3. An external (foreign) intervention (national, multilateral or UN) to help create 
conditions conducive to peace.”25 
These three conditions serve as the basis of my evaluation of the success of peacebuilding 
mechanisms in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The three categories all have elements that relate 
directly to methods used in BiH, and provide a coherent structure on which to base my 
evaluation of peacebuilding.  
The next term that begs definition – success – is an issue faced by numerous 
researchers. Some define success as simply “the establishment of stability and a rule of 
law,” while others view it as a more complex and multi-layered concept.26 The broader 
approach to peacebuilding typically requires a longer checklist of goals that need to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Jennifer M. Hazen, “Can Peacekeepers Be Peacebuilders?” in International Peacebuilding 13, 
No. 3 (2007), 324.  
24 David, “Does peacebuilding build peace?” 27.  
25 David, “Does peacebuilding build peace?” 27. 
26 Seth G. Jones, Establishing Law and Order After Conflict (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005): 
2.  
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met before peacebuilding can be characterized as a “success.” Strictly quantitative 
approaches can “impose formulaic thinking and ‘universal blueprints’ which neglect local 
conditions and promote- or impose- external agendas.”27 I chose to take a broader 
approach that is less tangible than the numerical approach, but is better able to 
incorporate the social aspects of peacebuilding, rather than solely the economic. 
 In terms of BiH, success is defined as meeting the three indicators described 
above – pursuit of rehabilitation, reconstruction, and reconciliation; creation of political 
and socio-economic mechanisms that build trust; and external intervention that helps 
create peace and stability. I argue that peacebuilding strategies in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
have been unsuccessful, as they have been unable to meet these three criteria that define 
and operationalize the success of peacebuilding. Data to support the failure of such 
mechanisms can be found in scholarly articles in the field that use BiH as a the looked-
down-upon case study, based on the state of the economy, unemployment levels, general 
public opinion regarding institutions, and other socioeconomic indicators.  
I also argue that the peacebuilding strategies used in Bosnia-Herzegovina have 
not met the expectations and needs of the citizens in BiH. This argument is in line with 
the previous one, because if peacebuilding mechanisms were unsuccessful, then they 
logically will have failed to meet the expectations and needs of the citizens. This is 
supported by the semi-structured interviews I conducted while living and researching in 
BiH from May – July 2014. This qualitative data is supplemented by participant 
observation and field research that I conducted as a result of being able to live and 
immerse myself in a post-conflict society such as BiH.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Newman, “‘Liberal’ peacebuilding debates,” 29. 
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Whereas my first research question is answered by mostly scholarly literature 
(and therefore secondary sources), my second research question is answered with a 
combination of primary sources, including my interview data and government 
documents. The difficulty of directly accessing government documents was a barrier to 
my research, as I cannot speak the local language (Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian), and the 
current government in BiH is not known for its transparency. To replace these sources, I 
deferred to scholarly literature that had conducted government research in BiH but have 
produced research articles written in English.  
In my semi-structured interviews, I had planned on conducting an evenly 
distributed sample among the three prominent ethno-religious groups – Christian 
Orthodox Serb, Roman Catholic Croat, and Muslim Bosniaks. However, this proved to be 
much more difficult than I anticipated, as the first two and a half weeks of my time in 
BiH were spent doing aid work in response to catastrophic flooding. Also, I lived in 
Sanski Most, which one interviewee described as “ethnically clean”- meaning that the 
vast majority of residents were the same ethnicity - which in this case, were Muslim 
Bosniaks.  
Most towns in BiH have a dominant ethnic majority, but some larger cities (such 
as the capital, Sarajevo) have become more diverse over time. This proved to be a major 
limitation to my research, because instead of having a diverse research sample, all of my 
interviewees were Muslim Bosniaks – which most view as the victims’ side of the war. 
Although this differed from my original research plan, it was fascinating in its own right, 
as I was able to glimpse the emotional devastation of the conflict, which is so often lost in 
the simple comparison of numbers (of casualties, victims, etc.). I interviewed seventeen 
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people (eight women and nine men) between the ages of 18 and 52. I organized my 
questions into three themes – the roles of truth, memory, and justice in rebuilding post-
conflict BiH. The structure of the second chapter will also be organized into these three 
themes, and will incorporate quotes from the interviews, while using pseudonyms to 
protect the identity of participants. The full list of my interview questions is included in 
Appendix I.  
V.	  Chapter	  One:	  State-­‐Level	  
How successful have peacebuilding strategies been in Bosnia-Herzegovina? 
 
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, and for the purposes of this essay, success is defined as 
meeting the three indicators described above – pursuit of rehabilitation, reconstruction, 
and reconciliation; creation of political and socio-economic mechanisms that build trust; 
and external intervention that helps create peace and stability. I argue that peacebuilding 
strategies in Bosnia-Herzegovina have been unsuccessful, as they have been unable to 
meet these three criteria that define and operationalize the success of peacebuilding. 
However, other scholars have argued, “Bosnia can be characterized as a mixed success, 
in particular after August of 1995, when peacebuilding efforts have been more 
successful.”28 This view uses the narrow approach to peacebuilding, as described above, 
which largely considers an end to fighting the single indicator of success.  
The “mixed success” description refers to a couple other indicators, such as 
economy, unemployment, and corruption – all of which, in the eyes of some scholars, are 
showing “clear signs of a slow but steady progress” along with “normalization in 
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relations between the local factions” in BiH.29  The reasons for this “mixed success” are 
largely attributed to the Dayton Accords, in which American negotiator Richard 
Holbrooke “brought to the negotiation table the leaders of all [ethno-religious] parties 
who were active participants in the conflict” in order to “achieve a lasting agreement.”30 
According to an article based on the Failed States Index (FSI) data from 2014, Bosnia-
Herzegovina is tied with India for most-improved country of the past decade, and has an 
“impressive trajectory” with its gain of 51 places in the FSI rankings from 2006 to 
2014.31  
As impressive as these statistics may seem at first glance, in reality, BiH is still in 
the “High Warning” category of FSI data, and BiH’s scores for Factionalized Elites, 
Human Rights, and Rule of Law have actually worsened in the past decade.32 Also, the 
data that supported BiH as a “mixed success” has a caveat at the end of the article, which 
says, “Although we do not have event data beyond the end of 1995, since 1996 Bosnia 
has been relatively stable with low levels of data.”33 In my opinion, it is difficult to make 
this assumption when there is no relevant, modern data to support it. The lack of access to 
data is, in itself, an indicator of the lack of transparency by the government of BiH. Even 
though the blatant, all-out war and genocide has ended, the stability and future of BiH is 
still in question.  
The primary obstacle to recovery is that “the state remains ethnically and 
democratically polarized,” and “being subject to separatist political agendas, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Gizelis and Kosek, “Why Humanitarian Interventions Succeed or Fail,” 378.  
30 Gizelis and Kosek, “Why Humanitarian Interventions Succeed or Fail,” 379. 
31 Laura Brisard, “A Decade of Recovery: Bosnia and the Balkans Bounce Back,” Fund for Peace 
(June 2014), 1.  
32 Brisard, “A Decade of Recovery,” 1.  
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government is constantly deadlocked and unable to move forward.”34 The attempts at the 
first indicator of success – the pursuit of rehabilitation, reconstruction, and reconciliation 
– have largely failed as a result of such polarization. Peacebuilding mechanisms in BiH 
have so far focused only on surface-level tensions, and have ignored the root causes that 
began the conflict in the first place. The goal of peacebuilding should be to remove “the 
structural causes of conflict” and create “non-violent mechanisms for resolving social 
conflicts,” but in BiH, “national and international observers alike agree that the 
underlying causes of the war have been inadequately addressed in the post-war period 
and continue to pose a challenge to the peace process.”35 As stated by Boutros Boutros-
Ghali, former Secretary General of the Untied Nations, “the sources of conflict and war 
are pervasive and deep,” and it takes a sustained, focused effort to tackle the roots of 
conflict.36  
Rehabilitation, reconstruction, and reconciliation have also proved elusive in BiH 
as a result of the partition of the country by the Dayton Accords. BiH was divided in two- 
the Federation and Republika Srpska (RS) – that are defined by dominant ethno-religious 
identities (Bosniak Muslims in the Federation and Serbs in RS). This partition created 
political deadlock that has allowed RS “to move forward with its own separate – and 
probably separatist – agendas while Bosnia remains politically deadlocked.”37 At the time 
of the Dayton Accords, partition seemed to be the only option that would ensure stability, 
but it was not meant to last for more than twenty years. The ethnically homogenous mini-
states within BiH have made compromises difficult, as every policy “must be geared 	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35 Hazen, “Can Peacekeepers Be Peacebuilders?” 326, 329.  
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towards both the Federation and the Bosnian Serb Republic” instead of for the good of 
the country as a whole.38 The goal is to create a single state that encompasses the two 
entities and three ethno-religious groups, but for now, they remain divided.   
These divisions are even more apparent in the political system of BiH, as the 
presidency is divided into thirds – one for each ethno-religious group – and citizens are 
likely to vote along nationalistic lines. The three-way division is “replicated from the 
national to municipal level and reflects the entrenched ethnic positions adopted during the 
war and persisting in the post-war environment.”39 The Dayton Accords put in place this 
decentralized structure of government in order to bring all three sides of the conflict to 
the negotiating table, but it ultimately institutionalized the ethno-religious differences 
created by the civil war. This further contributes to political stagnation, as political 
leaders stoke ethno-religious divides in order to be elected, and once they are in office, 
refuse to pass laws that benefit groups outside of their own. 
The political paralysis in the national government of BiH impacts all levels of 
society, as even education policies become politicized and divided by ethno-religious 
lines. Several of my interviewees described how each schools’ textbook differs based on 
the dominant ethno-religious identity in that town – so students who live in neighboring 
towns may read a Bosniak-biased book in the Federation, and a Serb-biased book in 
Republika Srpska. There is no single history of the war that is taught in BiH, so each 
student grows up already biased towards one group or another, further replicating the 
tensions that began the war in the first place. The education system is defined by 
“incompatible curricula, syllabi and textbooks for each of the constituent peoples, often 	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influenced by the political elites.”40 In order to successfully pursue rehabilitation, 
reconstruction, and reconciliation, as stated in the definition of success in peacebuilding, 
there needs to be a common curriculum to provide “sustained education for peace, 
coexistence, and reconciliation” in “societies making the transition from protracted 
conflict to the consolidation of peace.”41 
The second indicator of success in peacebuilding is whether security, political, or 
socioeconomic mechanisms exist to build trust between conflicting parties within a state. 
In BiH, this is another failed example, as “over a decade after the Dayton Accords, an 
ambivalent form of peace exists in BiH,” with a “semblance of security” but not much 
outside of that.42 The security mechanisms are in dire need of reform, specifically in 
terms of increasing “respect for the rule of law, commitment to democracy, and 
government legitimacy,” all of which are described as “critical pillars of the ultimate 
policy objective in Bosnia.”43 As of now, security mechanisms are failing to build trust in 
BiH, scrutinized “in the eyes of a population that currently has more reason to fear its 
soldiers.”44 
Low public trust of political and socio-economic institutions creates barriers to 
“creating a climate of confidence in Bosnian society,” which is necessary for stability and 
success of peacebuilding.45 There needs to be social support for non-violent conflict 
resolution mechanisms, but such support “flounders when these mechanisms do not 
function effectively,” often as a result of corruption, lack of transparency, and rampant 	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impunity- case in point in BiH.46 The citizens have little reason to support such conflict 
resolution mechanisms, as many of them are merely channels for political elites to pocket 
funds and further embed corruption in government. It is this “lack of confidence in the 
ability of the government to provide a better future” that is “indicative of a lack of 
legitimacy in the government as a whole” in BiH.47  
The governments’ tripartite divide continues to prevent the establishment of 
security, political, or socio-economic mechanisms to build trust between ethno-religious 
groups. The lack of such mechanisms supports the notion that peacebuilding efforts have 
been unsuccessful, as “the nationalist rhetoric of the ethnic parties remains and indicates 
that a sense of a multi-ethnic community is a myth or utopian dream.”48 The judicial 
system provides another example of dysfunction, as “ the rule of law has failed primarily 
due to the division of the judicial system into three parallel systems presided over by the 
unaccountable internationals.”49 Even the police forces are divided into Bosniak, Croat, 
and Serb divisions, each with its own jurisdiction and priorities. The justice system also 
has an enormous backlog of cases, and frequently fails to indict perpetrators due to the 
lack of evidence, disappearance of witnesses, or political pressure. This proves the point 
that “a post-conflict environment does not always offer the capacity to create effective 
accountability mechanisms in the state or territory.”50 
The third, and final, indicator of success in peacebuilding is the ability of external 
intervention to help create peace and stability in a post-conflict state. I argue that this 	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indicator could be characterized as a “mixed success,” as described by the counter 
arguments above, because external intervention did ultimately end the genocide and 
violence of the war. However, there are many criticisms of the Dayton Accords, primarily 
centered on the institutionalization of ethnic divisions in BiH. It was meant to be a 
temporary solution, but has remained for 20+ years, with little progress in terms of 
reform of the constitution or legitimization of the government. A second popular 
criticism refers back to the literature review, in that “the clear aim of the international 
community through the Dayton Accords…was to reconstruct Bosnia as a western liberal 
democratic state,” in pursuit of the liberal peace theory.51  
Although many international actors may have had good intentions, “the attempts 
by the external actors to keep as neutral a position as possible during the first stages of 
the intervention in Bosnia failed, as severe problems of coordination between the civilian 
and the military component of the intervention plagued the peace-making efforts.”52 This 
lack of coordination, which occurred between foreign governments, non-profit 
organizations, and global institutions, meant that the immense amount of aid channeled to 
BiH had little impact on building sustainable peace. The United Nations had a particular 
battle in terms of having an ambiguous mandate and lack of organizational structure, 
which further contributed to local mistrust of the UN after the Srebrenica Genocide. The 
success of some external interventions (i.e., the NATO bombing campaign of Serb 
forces) and the failure of others (i.e., the Srebrenica genocide) contribute to the “mixed 
record” of peacebuilding in BiH.  
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 Overall, when defining peacebuilding success as meeting the three 
aforementioned indicators - pursuit of rehabilitation, reconstruction, and reconciliation; 
creation of political and socio-economic mechanisms that build trust; and external 
intervention that helps create peace and stability – peacebuilding strategies have clearly 
been unsuccessful in BiH. The first two conditions have plainly not been met, and while 
the third could be described as having a “mixed record,” for the purposes of 
peacebuilding (creating long-term stability), it has also been unsuccessful. These 
indicators, which support my argument that peacebuilding has been unsuccessful at the 
state level, also help support my argument that peacebuilding has been unsuccessful at 
the individual level in BiH, which will be further explored in chapter two. 
VI.	  Chapter	  Two:	  Individual-­‐Level	  
How have peacebuilding strategies met the expectations and needs of the citizens in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina?	  
 
 The secondary research question –if the aforementioned peacebuilding strategies 
have met the expectations and needs of the citizens in Bosnia-Herzegovina – focuses on 
the individual level of society. My argument is that peacebuilding strategies used in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina have not met the expectations and long-term needs of the citizens in 
BiH. Since peacebuilding mechanisms have been unsuccessful at the state level, they 
have logically been unable to “trickle down” and have any success at the individual level. 
My analysis of this research question is based my field research in BiH from May - July 
2014, in which I interviewed seventeen people between the ages of 18 and 52.  
I interviewed eight women and nine men with the help of a local translator 
(Dijana Merdonović) who conducted the interview in Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian (the 
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official language of BiH). Immediately following the interviews, Dijana and I would 
listen to the taped recording and she would translate it into English as I transcribed the 
quotes on my laptop. My interview questions were organized into three themes, the roles 
of truth, memory, and justice in rebuilding post-conflict BiH. The full list of these 
questions can be found in appendix I. My goal was to analyze how post-conflict 
peacebuilding mechanisms have or have not worked to meet the expectations and needs 
of local citizens in BiH. I hoped to ascertain this goal by talking to a diverse variety of 
local citizens, but as mentioned earlier in the Research Design and Methodology section, 
this proved to be rather difficult due to the composition of the town of Sanski Most. The 
entire sample included only interviews with Muslim Bosniaks, who were the primary 
targets of the ethnic cleansing campaign during the war.   
I lived in a small town in the northwestern corner of BiH called Sanski Most, and 
for all practical purposes, it was “ethnically clean” after the war, meaning that the vast 
majority of residents are from one ethno-religious group – in this case, Muslim Bosniaks. 
Before the war, the town was fairly evenly divided between Muslim Bosniaks, Catholic 
Croats, and Orthodox Serbs. During the war, Serb soldiers invaded Sanski Most and 
forced everyone to flee from their homes. In the nearby town of Prijedor, Serb forces 
murdered more than 3,000 civilians (predominately Muslim Bosniaks) in their campaign 
of ethnic cleansing. The fortunate Bosniaks were able to escape to nearby countries 
(Slovenia, Croatia, etc.) to live out the duration of the war.  
My foreign mentor, Vahidin Omanović, was able to escape with his family and 
live as a refugee for several years. However, once he and his family returned to Sanski 
Most, they found their homes and livelihoods destroyed. The entire community had to 
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rebuild their lives from scratch, while many of the Serb soldiers ended up living in nearby 
Prijedor, claiming houses as their own and evading justice. My close friend in Sanski 
Most, Mevludin Rahmanović, said that he frequently sees his uncle’s murderer walking 
free down the streets of Prijedor – but due to the aforementioned inefficiency of the BiH 
justice system, it is unlikely that he will ever face justice.  
My semi-structured interview style allowed for questions to be answered in 
various ways. Respondents who were uncomfortable sharing information (or, in the 
beginning, did not trust me) could give one-word answers or short statements to convey 
their points. As the interviews progressed, however, respondents tended to get more 
comfortable and were more willing to share longer stories. The volunteer work I carried 
out during the floods helped me gain interviewees’ trust, and turned out to be key in 
terms of gaining access in the community. Local citizens were much more open to 
interviews once they recognized me from the aid work I did during the floods. Many 
interviewees agreed to talk simply based on whom we knew in common (which was often 
either my mentor, Vahidin, or my translator, Dijana), and increasingly became family 
members of friends I had made through the Center for Peacebuilding.   
Interviews were between one to two hours long, and the majority was conducted 
at Palazzo, a café on the Sana River in the center of Sanski Most. I offered to buy 
interviewees a cup of coffee (or two) in exchange for the time they spent with Dijana and 
I, and as I soon found out, coffee was the biggest key to getting people to feel 
comfortable. We would start the interview slowly, with Dijana and the interviewee 
discussing whom they knew in common (always essential for trust), and about the context 
of the interview (where I was from, why I was there, letter of consent, purpose of 
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research, etc.). Then we would discuss demographics (name, occupation, marital status, 
etc.), before diving into the list of questions organized into truth, memory, and justice. 
Prior to our first interview, Dijana and I had conducted several practice interviews, so 
that she knew the type of follow-up questions I would ask, as well as the core of what I 
hoped to address in my research.  
In my initial grant proposal, I had planned to focus solely on post-conflict BiH, as 
in what happened after the war, but many respondents viewed the interviews as a form of 
“therapy” and a time to express the traumas they had faced during the war. This meant 
that every interview was unique, and covered vastly different topics – making a 
numerical comparison of questions (x answered “yes,” z answered “no,” for example) 
less interesting. I found it more powerful to identify key quotes that conveyed the 
feelings of respondents. The overall tone of my research turned out to be fairly negative, 
summed up by a 39-year old imam named Alen53 who stated, “We [Bosnians] live in a 
constant atmosphere of fear. The war could start again tomorrow.”54 This unstable future, 
a red flag that peacebuilding mechanisms have failed, meant that the present situation is 
plagued by a persistent underlying sadness, as most respondents have little hope for BiH.  
TRUTH 
In terms of truth, I asked questions about the respondent’s definition of truth 
about the war in BiH, the likelihood of finding the rest of the mass graves, the search for 
the “whole truth” about the war, and the potential for compensation for victims. In my 
analysis, it was evident that the majority of respondents viewed truth as the most 
important part of post-conflict reconstruction in BiH (see figure 1 below). The lack of the 	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“whole truth,” or one common narrative about what happened during the war, is a 
constant barrier to BiH being able to move forward. As stated by Damir, a 52-year-old 
male who was a soldier in the Bosnian military during the war, “We [Bosniaks] have our 
own truth and they [Serbs] have their own truth and those truths are completely 
different… When history doesn’t write who was the winner and who was the loser, when 
there are so many different versions of the truth… can you imagine how many lies there 
are?”55 
  
The obstacles created by this lack of “one truth” were mentioned earlier in the 
response to the primary research question, and were reiterated by Jasmin, a 18-year old 
student who said, “We [students] all have different history textbooks…whether you are 
Bosniak, Serb, or Croat… Whether you live in the Federation or in RS [Republika 
Srpska]. They all have different versions of the same event.”56 Ada, a 50-year old woman 
who worked at a nursing home, said, “History classes need to educate our children in the 
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Figure 1 
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same truth. One truth.”57 Djeno, a 33-year old imam, said, “For reconciliation, we have to 
hear every single truth, or at least give everyone a chance to tell their own truth. We have 
to be aware. Sometimes we will like it, sometimes we won’t, but it’s the truth, and the 
ugly truth is better than a nice lie.”58 These ugly truths are certain to come out eventually, 
and in order for society to move forward, a coherent narrative needs to be established that 
portrays the realities of the war without further increasing tensions between the three 
ethno-religious groups.  
One “ugly truth” continues to resurface as mass graves are discovered throughout 
BiH. During one of the last weeks of my time in BiH, a funeral procession was held for 
287 bodies that had been recently found in a nearby mass grave (Tomašica). Multiple 
semi-trucks full of coffins slowly drove through the town of Sanski Most, as hundreds of 
Bosniaks wept by the side of the road for the loved ones they had lost. Crying mothers 
wove roses in the ropes on the side of the trucks, and others wailed as they imagined the 
horrors that these 287 victims suffered before their murders. Even as an objective 
researcher, it is hard to support reconciliation with Serbs after witnessing the stark pain of 
Bosniaks who had lost so much during the war. The element of truth that interviewees 
seemed to cling to as the most necessary condition for recovery was for perpetrators to 
admit the location of mass graves, so that families could be able to properly grieve and 
bury their loved ones.  
Edib, a 44-year old man who works for a Bosnian non-profit organization that 
works to find missing victims’ remains, said, “there are still 9,000 people missing from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Ada, female, 50, manager of a soup kitchen. 
58 Djeno, male, 33, imam.  
	   Waller	  28	  
the war in all of Bosnia-Herzegovina.”59 Aldin, a 20-year old student, said, “In Prijedor [a 
town 20 minutes from Sanski Most], they are still trying to find people- about 2,000 
people remain missing. Seven hundred people were murdered in Sanski Most…about one 
hundred of these bodies still have not been found.”60 According to the CIA World 
Factbook, the entirety of BiH is roughly the size of West Virginia- so one would think 
that finding missing victims should not have taken 20+ years.61 However, as Edib went 
on to describe,  “Even excavating mass graves has become political…the government 
knows the location of more graves, but they wait to excavate until the next election cycle. 
They say they are waiting for ‘better times,’ but it is not about money, it is about 
politics.” 62  
If more perpetrators were to come forward and reveal the location of mass graves 
to the media, victims could be found much sooner than the next “appropriate” political 
cycle. Damir, the soldier mentioned earlier, said, “I know firsthand how hard it is to kill 
someone and go to bed at night. It all comes back in your nightmares. Their conscience 
[Serbs’] has to be haunted. They will have to confess eventually.”63 Many Bosniaks 
believe that perpetrators need to confess to the location of mass graves in order for the 
process of reconciliation to even begin. Elmina, a 33-year old ceramics teacher, said, “It 
is awful to know something…and to be silent for so many years. I don’t know how 
people can wake up in the morning and see themselves in the mirror and know such 
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crimes and still be silent.”64 The confusion over how perpetrators were able to commit 
such atrocities was a recurring theme throughout my interviews, as respondents were 
shocked by both the start of the war and the ensuing violence. 
Sabina, a 42-year old manager of a local soup kitchen and residential facility, 
conveyed her shock when she said, “Still after twenty years, I don’t understand how it 
happened overnight. All the Serbs and all the Croats knew…Bosniaks were blind, 
completely in the dark. We were lambs prepared for slaughter who had no idea.”65 
Samra, a 31-year old project assistant in the local tourism office, expressed a similar 
sentiment when she said, “They [Serbs] just snapped. There is no ideology that could 
make me kill someone…it is still a mystery to me why, and how, they could do this…It 
takes years and years and centuries of built-up hatred.”66  She went onto describe the 
mentality of the perpetrators, with, “to Serbs, there was no difference if you were 
Catholic [Croat] or Muslim [Bosniak]…If you were not Serb, you had to die.”67 
Many Bosniaks argue that the meticulous planning and organization of the war 
(on the Serb side) are indicators of genocide. Edib describes it, as “Serb intellectuals 
became ideologists they seduced people and started the war People believed whatever 
they said.”68 Damir believed that the war began “because of Serb aggression…they 
wanted to take our territory, they wanted to divide my country. This is why I joined [the 
military].” He firmly believes that this aggression still exists, as “Serbs and Croats still 
have aspirations for Bosnian territory. They still want it after all these years.”69  
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Regardless of how the war began, the subsequent horrors should be hard to deny. 
Ada, a 50-year old woman who works in a nursing home, said, “Everyone knows what 
really happened [during the war]. Serbs are in denial…some kind of mass illusion. We 
can’t go forward because there is denial on their [Serbs’] side and rage on our 
[Bosniaks’] side because of their denial.”70 Ada has particularly strong feelings on this 
because her husband was held in Omasrka concentration camp – the site of many 
atrocities, and the location of the infamous Times magazine cover photo (see photo 1 
below). 
  71 
Without one common truth, and therefore one common history, future generations 
are going to continue to learn ethnically-biased versions of history that will further embed 
tensions between groups in BiH. Samra said, “It is very important that they [perpetrators] 
admit what they did was wrong…There are so many Serbs that believe they did nothing 
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wrong. For them, they were fighting for their country, for their nation. But you don’t kill 
women and children, civilians, in a war over land.”72 She went on to describe the war as 
genocide, because “It was so organized… When you carry out this scale of murder, you 
have to have political power, it has to come from a higher level.”73 Damir said, 
“Politicians know what the truth is, they can’t keep pretending. The number of victims, 
the bodies… the majority of those killed were Bosniaks. It was genocide, the numbers 
speak for themselves.”74 
These emotional responses to my interview questions about truth were more than 
enough to support the conclusion that defining one common history is crucial in order for 
BiH to be able to create a stable, sustainable peace (the goal of peacebuilding).  Ahmet, a 
31-year old doctor, said, “The truth still needs to be told, even if it is twenty years later. 
Politicians just keep talking and talking, but nothing about truth… We need to have a 
conversation on all sides and talk through what actually happened.”75 The role of memory 
has close ties to the role of truth in rebuilding post-conflict BiH, as it is difficult to 
memorialize a divided and disputed history.  
MEMORY 
In terms of memory, I asked questions about how respondents felt that BiH has 
dealt with the memories of genocide and war, how they personally have dealt with the 
memories of war, and the first thing that comes to their mind when I mentioned the war 
in Bosnia. Most respondents agreed that memory is crucial to recovery, because by 
sweeping war and tragedy under the rug, the root causes of conflict still remain. This is 	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certainly the case in BiH, and Djeno predicted, “We might have another genocide by 
tomorrow morning. This is not finished. All it takes is one crazy guy in power – and we 
have plenty.”76 In this instance, Djeno was referring to the corrupt political elites that run 
the country, and how they misuse memory to gain re-election (i.e., by reminding voters of 
the hatred between groups). The conflicting memorials to memory are another source of 
tension between the three groups. 
As Edib described, “Prijedor [nearby town] is surrounded by mass graves [of 
Bosniak victims], but in the center of town there is a monument for Serb soldiers who 
died during the war. People are brainwashed.”77 Monuments and memorials are 
frequently vandalized or destroyed depending on which territory they are in, which is a 
painful reminder of how far Bosnia has to go before it can reconcile its past. In January 
2014, “Bosnian Serb municipal authorities, backed up by police, entered a Muslim 
cemetery in the town of Visegrad [BiH] to remove the word ‘genocide’ from a memorial 
to Bosniak war victims.”78 The reasoning behind this destruction is that there as been no 
“official verdict” that this particular massacre was genocide.  
Even without memorials being blatantly destroyed, “there are so many physical 
traces of war…crumbling buildings, things we [Bosnians] don’t have money to fix.”79 
This is particularly evident in the capital city of Sarajevo, which survived a four-year 
siege by Serb snipers in which some 400,000 inhabitants were “constantly shelled and 
sniped…people were cut off from food, medicine, water, and electricity. Thousands of 
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civilians were killed and wounded.”80 As one walks through the streets of Sarajevo over 
twenty years later, the craters left by bombshells seem to be on every street corner, and 
most buildings are still riddled with bullet holes. As Sabina described, “The country 
[BiH] has so few memorials to war. It is almost as if it never happened. We have been so 
occupied with trying to survive in the present, we can’t properly deal with the past.”81 
The struggle in the present takes precedence over fixing facades or investing in 
memorials to the past. 
 Although it was not my intention when crafting the interview questions, one 
seemed to provoke the most painful responses. The question “What is the first thing that 
comes to your mind when I mention the war in Bosnia?” was met with a variety of 
disturbing and heart-wrenching responses. Lejla responded, “Basement. We hid in the 
basement of a three-floor house during the war.”82 Aldin responded, “Victims. People 
who lost family members… sons, daughters, fathers…that was the worst sacrifice.”83 
Mirela had several responses – “Raping, suffering, torturing. Tragedy. Hunger.”84 Mirela 
survived off of corn flour during the war, because it was too dangerous to leave the house 
to find proper food. Damir responded, “Suffering. The worst part of the war [to me] was 
to see children suffering, to see civilians suffering. I can understand when soldiers fight 
each other…But not when they come and burn down a village and kill innocent people. 
When you are in the army, you have weapons to defend yourself…civilians do not.”85 I 
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chose to display the responses to this question in a word cloud (see figure 2 below), as it 
had the most visual impact (as opposed to a list of responses). 
 
 
Some respondents thought, “We [Bosnians] haven’t done enough to prevent the 
war from being forgotten,”86 while others said they “think about it [the war] all the time” 
and “can’t escape it.”87 Elmina said, “We can’t always focus on things that happened 50 
years ago…or what our grandparents did to who…we can’t keep running around in 
circles.”88 Lejla struggled with how “the memory of war is always floating nearby. 
Everything is a trigger [for memories of the war].”89 Edib said, “In the government, there 
is no law that concerns memorials or anniversaries…we need a monument with a 
message that says ‘this should not happen again,’ something that tells a story, in all 
mediums.”90 Edib devoted his life to finding the missing remains of victims because he 
was brokenhearted after seeing many people die before they found they bodies of their 	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Figure 2 
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loved ones. He describes memory as being “different from person to person and nation to 
nation. We [Bosnians] can’t agree about anything…we can’t move on when one side is 
always ignoring or denying what happened.”91 
In addition to a monument that tells the real story of the war, many respondents 
advocated for one day that commemorates all victims. Alen said, “We have only three 
days when we are reminded of what happened [during the war] – May 31, July 11, and 
July 20. But the narrative on these days is to place blame, not to commemorate the 
victims…we need to learn how to acknowledge suffering on all sides.”92 Ahmet agreed, 
and said, “We can’t find the right way to cope with what happened [during the war]. 
There should be a day for remembering the whole war and all victims…not just one day 
for one genocide, or one day for Federation and another day for RS [Republika Srpska]. 
We should have one day when the whole nation remembers.”93  
As difficult as it was to hear victims’ stories of survival during the war, many of 
them said it was therapeutic. Samra described, “We don’t have anyone to talk to. I think 
it is important to have professional help (psychologists) for that. I deal with it the best 
way that I know, but it isn’t enough…for anyone. It is very hard to talk about the war. 
You almost can’t talk about it with someone who didn’t go through it. For me, I very 
rarely talk about it. So this [interview] is an exception.”94 There is a stigma that your 
family will be shamed for generations if you go to a counselor, because  “the opinion of 
people here [in BiH] is if you go to therapy, you must be crazy.”95 
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The issue of memory is equally as relevant for soldiers as it is for civilians in BiH. 
Damir described how many of his fellow soldiers suffer from post-traumatic stress 
disorder, “but not just because of their time in the military and the horrible crimes they 
saw, but because they now live in poverty and don’t have a job. They felt used. They 
were fighting and willing to give up their lives for a country that now doesn’t care about 
them.”96 Damir was fortunate to be able to get a job at the local post office to support his 
family after the war, but many of his friends are struggling to survive off of the paltry 
military pension from the government. He said, “for the first three years after the war, I 
had trauma and nightmares…I was lucky to be able to come back to my old job- it was a 
distraction. I write books, which is a type of therapy for me. I can write down everything 
I have in my mind and everything that is bothering me in stories, songs, or poems.”97 His 
fellow soldiers do not have such coping strategies, and have been battling for survival 
since 1996.  
 The role of memory in rebuilding post-conflict BiH is essential to recovery, in 
addition to finding one common truth, as described in the previous section. The final 
important theme to consider is justice, as perpetrators walk free and have never faced 
justice for the crimes they committed during the war. As Sabina insists, “It is not possible 
to live peacefully without resolving the past,”98 which the third condition for creating a 
stable, sustainable peace in BiH.  
JUSTICE 
I asked questions about respondents’ opinions on the international courts (the 
Hague, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, International Criminal 	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Court), national courts of BiH, and local courts (for most, this was courts in Sanski 
Most). Justice is paramount to protecting the future stability of BiH, because perpetrators 
who roam free are a daily reminder to victims of the failures of the government and 
judicial systems. Many respondents felt like there was no adequate punishment for the 
severity of the crimes that Serbs had committed during the war. Admir, a 33-year old 
man who is the director of a religious non-profit in BiH, commented on justice by saying,  
“when someone kills 100 people, you can’t kill him 100 times in punishment.”99 Admir 
also noted how “being vengeful and angry traps many people” but he refuses to be one of 
them, and says that the only true justice for perpetrators will come from God.100  
Lejla, a 37-year old mother of six, said, “There is no adequate punishment or 
compensation for what they [Serbs] have done.”101 Mirela agrees, and said, “There is no 
justice for someone who killed so many people.  You can’t count someone’s life in years 
spent in prison.”102 Samra thinks that you can’t compensate families for their lost loved 
ones, “but it will be some kind of relief if they [Serbs] call it the right name – ‘genocide’ 
– and admit it was wrong. It could be some kind of beginning.”103 Samra’s comment 
brings us back to the issues of truth and memory, in which there is denial on all sides of 
the conflict preventing victims from moving forward. Alen expressed a similar feeling 
when he said, “For the moment, it would be enough if Serbs would admit it, and say ‘yes, 
this is what we did.” After grieving, their denial is the most hurtful piece.”104 The 
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rampant impunity of perpetrators is all but commonplace in BiH, as described by the next 
sequence of stories from interviewees. 
Ada said, “When my husband visits Prijedor, he walks by the men who put him in 
a concentration camp [Omarska, described earlier]. They [perpetrators] are still free- 
nothing has happened to them. The courts aren’t doing their job.”105 Djeno had a similar 
experience with the dysfunctional, corrupt justice system: 
“My neighbor was sentenced to life in prison for killing my grandfather.  After a 
couple years, his relatives were going around offering money and threatening 
witnesses. There was a retrial, and many witnesses pulled back their testimonies. 
Just like that, after only eight years, this guy was freed. I am sick of cases like 
this. We can’t protect our witnesses, so why would more come forward?”106 
Alen said, “The corruption is beyond imagination [in BiH],” not only in the justice 
system, but also in the medical and political fields as well. I witnessed a commonplace 
example of this corruption during my time in BiH, when my mentor had to bring a bag of 
coffee to the hospital just to get an appointment with a doctor to get a kidney stone 
removed. He said that this type of bribery is so ingrained into the system that it is 
expected. 
In her description of the corrupt systems in BiH, Ada said, “We [Bosniaks] have 
an expression that our laws are ‘dead letters on paper.’ Even if a law gets broken, there is 
no force behind it, no punishment.”107 She describes the international court as “nothing 
but a big theater,”108 and Jasmin said, “If the local court didn’t exist, life would still be 
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the same here…they don’t do anything. Same with the police.”109 Most of the time, when 
I got to the “justice” section of my interview and started asking about the respondent’s 
opinion on courts, they would simply laugh. Some would roll their eyes as if thinking, 
“this naïve American actually thinks we have a justice system!” I continued to ask 
questions about the courts and police to all of my interviewees, but it was nearly always 
the same, laughing response.  
Once we had moved past the broken justice system of BiH, it led into multiple 
interesting conversations about interviewees’ perceptions of perpetrators. I would ask 
whether or not perpetrators could compensate victims and their families for their loss 
(always a resounding “no”), and then ask about the characteristics of the perpetrators 
themselves. Edib said, “Most of them were normal people before they were killers…they 
were intellectuals, high school teachers, who overnight became murderers. Only a few of 
them were criminals before the war. They suddenly killed their neighbors, and because 
no one prosecuted them, they are now back to their normal lives.”110 Djeno also 
commented on perpetrators going back to their normal lives when he said, “In Prijedor, 
3,000 men, women, and children were killed during the war, but we have less than ten 
people in jail for it. That, for me, is not acceptable.”111 He also said that his “biggest 
problem is that when Serbs committed war crimes, it was organized by the state, the 
regime, the government. When Bosniaks committed crimes [during the war], it was not 
organized, it was self-defense.”112 
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Samra reflected on how the perpetrators “became different people overnight…you 
can’t possibly imagine the transformation.”113 It was a neighbors-turning-on-neighbors 
situation, a parallel to Rwanda, in which the victims were shocked when friends and even 
family members turned on them in an instant. Sabina said, “It is impossible that someone 
could make me kill someone if I didn’t want to…It is unacceptable to kill someone, 
especially in those cruel and sick ways. It had to be some kind of mass hypnosis.”114 The 
fact that perpetrators continue to evade justice is a problem regardless of their 
motivations. A big part of this impunity is due to the corrupt political system that 
reinforces ethno-religious divisions between the three groups.  
Mirela described such political tactics when she said, “Every time we [Bosniaks 
and Serbs] start to get along, politicians remind us how we are different…they come and 
say no, you must be careful of the others, they could attack again… Politicians are to 
blame for our separation.”115 Samra describes a similar scenario in which, “we have 
leaders who are encouraging these [ethno-religious] differences. In every election 
through the years it is the same…they just bring back bad memories and hatred. They 
bring up nationalism, they feed us rage…there is no future with that.”116 Sabina simply 
said, “Life would be easier if we didn’t have politicians,”117 and Ada said, “Politicians 
need to confess and admit to their crimes first. Then others will follow.”118 
Djeno describes election season and the ensuring nationalism as a “trauma trigger 
that brings us back to 1992. Politicians used this to their advantage then [to start the war] 
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and they will use it again now.”119 Alen sums up elections by saying, “We don’t have a 
good political party to vote for – so we just vote for the less evil party. And this is always 
the one that protects our own ethnicity.”120 By being forced to pick sides based on ethno-
religious identity, the political system of BiH is further entrenching the divisions between 
the three groups. These divisions started the war in the first place, and there is a 
significant chance that they will start another one in the future.  
The current widespread impunity for perpetrators, stemming from corrupt judicial 
and political systems, is a barrier to stability and reinforces the argument that 
peacebuilding has been unsuccessful in BiH, particularly at the individual level. 
Neighbors turned on neighbors during the war, and since there has been no accountability 
for perpetrators, these same neighbors are still walking by each other on the streets of 
BiH. This reminds perpetrators to stay silent and victims to stay angry, which does 
nothing to help the country move forward towards a stable, sustainable peace.    
 Overall, my interviews did not portray widespread optimism in the future of BiH. 
The way the system is now, political elites have no political will or desire to change the 
constitution, which they are benefitting from by being able to pocket government funds. 
My analysis, organized by questions looking at truth, memory, and justice in rebuilding 
post-conflict BiH, clearly supports the argument that post-conflict peacebuilding 
strategies used in BiH have not met the expectations and needs of the citizens in BiH. If 
their needs and expectations had been met, citizens would have been more positive and 
optimistic about the future of BiH. Instead, they are predicting the relapse into future 
conflict, which is exactly the opposite of what peacebuilding seeks to achieve.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 Djeno, male, 33, imam. 
120 Alen, male, 39, imam.  
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VII.	  Conclusions	  and	  Implications	  
Throughout the entirety of this thesis, I have sought to answer two research 
questions. The primary research question, addressed in the first chapter, focuses on the 
state level and asks: How successful have peacebuilding strategies been in Bosnia-
Herzegovina? I argued that peacebuilding mechanisms in BiH have been largely 
unsuccessful, as they have been unable to meet three key indicators for success - pursuit 
of rehabilitation, reconstruction, and reconciliation; creation of political and socio-
economic mechanisms that build trust; and external intervention that helps create peace 
and stability.  The secondary research question, addressed in the second chapter, focuses 
on the individual level and asks: How have these peacebuilding strategies met the 
expectations and needs of the citizens in Bosnia-Herzegovina? I agued that as a result of 
peacebuilding mechanisms being unsuccessful, they also have not met the needs and 
expectations of the citizens of BiH.  
As has been stated, the response to both research questions are fairly similar in 
their findings that peacebuilding mechanisms in Bosnia-Herzegovina have been 
unsuccessful in achieving the goal of long-term stability and prevention of future conflict. 
Although the blatant violence and killings stopped with the signing of the Dayton 
Accords, the root causes of the conflict still remain, and have the potential to set the 
country up for failure in the future. A dominant theme in my interviews, the feelings of 
pessimism and apathy toward the future of BiH, indicate the potential for another 
conflict. Although I hope with everything in me that this is not the case, the data 
presented in this thesis seem to present a dark outlook for the future of BiH. In order to 
avoid future conflict, there needs to be significant reform of the constitution in BiH to 
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prevent political paralysis and help the country move forward both economically and 
socially.  
If institutions were restructured not only in government, but in the judicial and 
police systems as well, this would increase public trust in institutions. By reforming 
security, political, and socio-economic mechanisms to build trust between ethno-religious 
groups, citizens could focus less on corruption and instead focus on rehabilitation, 
reconstruction, and reconciliation. These goals could be met with the help of external 
intervention, but actors need to be wary of imposing a top-down liberal peacebuilding 
approach, and should instead adapt methods to fit the local context of BiH. If these three 
criterions were met, then it could be argued that peacebuilding mechanisms were 
successful in BiH. Until then, however, BiH will remain the unfortunate case study of 
“what not to do” when trying to implement successful peacebuilding mechanisms. It is 
essential to remember that if another conflict were to erupt in BiH, the potential for a 
domino effect on other Eastern European countries would make an impact across the 
globe - which is why it is infinitely better to work towards prevention now, rather than 
rely on conflict resolution later. 
“What we have right now is not peace. We have a war that is using 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Alen, male, 39, imam. 
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VIII.	  Appendix	  I	  –	  Interview	  Questions	  	  
Interview - Truth, Memory, and Justice in Post-Conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Demographic Information 
Name/Age/Ethnicity (Bosniak, Serb, Croat) 
Years of schooling/level of education 
Current family situation (married, single, divorced) 
Children (Yes or no)/Occupation 
Where did you live during the 1991-1995 war? Did you move after the war?   
Where is your family from originally? 
Truth 
What is your definition of truth (in general)? 
What is your definition of truth about the war in Bosnia? 
Do you think perpetrators have told the complete truth about the war?   
Do you think there are more mass graves that have yet to be discovered? How do you 
think the rest will be found (if more remain)? 
What else needs to be told in order for you to feel like the whole truth has been 
uncovered?  
Once the truth gets out, is there any way that perpetrators can compensate victims and 
victim’s families? What about bystanders (who knew and were silent for 20 years)?  
Memory 
How do you think that the country has dealt with the memories of genocide and war?  
How have you dealt with the memory of war? Do you think about it often?  
What triggers these memories?  
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What is the first thing that comes to your mind when I mention the war in Bosnia?  
Did you have friends of other ethno-religious identities before the war? Do you now?  
Justice 
How do you feel the international court has done in bringing justice to perpetrators (i.e., 
the Hague)? 
How do you feel the national court has done in bringing justice to perpetrators and 
victims? How about the local court in Sanski Most?  
Overall 
How do you feel about the path to reconciliation in Bosnia-Herzegovina?  
Do you think there is healing between victims and perpetrators? How long do you think it 
will take for society to heal (if ever)?  
What do you think Bosnia will be like in 5-10 years? Do you see yourself still in Bosnia, 
or somewhere else? 
What do you think is most important to healing and post-conflict reconstruction (truth, 
memory, justice)? What will make society whole again? 
Youth (18-25)- Does the memory of the war impact you, even though you weren't alive at 
the time? If yes, how so? Adults (26+)- Do you think the memory of war will impact 
your children?  
What role do you believe the European Union and the United States played during the 
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IX.	  Appendix	  II-­‐	  Stories	  of	  Survival	  	  
Throughout my interviews with local citizens in BiH, I heard incredible stories of 
survival, as many of the respondents had vivid memories of suffering throughout the war 
from 1992-1995. These stories served as an essential part of the interviews, as they 
provided the background and personal experiences of each respondent. They allowed me, 
as a researcher, to understand the past behind their present, and to seek to comprehend 
their feelings about modern-day BiH. The quotes serve as supplemental material that was 
essential to my research and understanding, but did not precisely fit into either of the 
previous chapters. They are organized by the pseudonyms of each respondent, along with 
their gender, age, and occupation (corresponding to the previous footnotes).  
Samra 
Female, 31, project assistant in tourist office 
• “My father went missing [from Prijedor] at the beginning of the war. We heard he 
was in a concentration camp…but we didn’t find his remains until 2002. They 
were in a mass grave in a mine close by.” 
• “My great grandfather was an imam in Prijedor. He lived in a house attached to 
the mosque. The Serbs bombed the mosques first [at the beginning of the war]…. 
My uncle, aunt, great grandmother, and great grandfather…they all died. Only the 
children survived. I was eight when that happened [when the mosque was 
bombed]. To me it was as if my Serb neighbors just woke up that morning and 
decided to become a mass murderer…to children, this is what it looked like. 
There was no place to hide, because we all lived together…Serbs and Bosniaks.” 
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• “Two years after the beginning of the war, my grandfather saw his best man (from 
his wedding), who was a Serb, and he asked him ‘Have you seen my son? Is he 
alive?’ and the man responded ‘No, but if I do [see him], I will kill him myself.’ 
Before the war, they were best friends…I played with his children when I was 
little. It was really shocking.” 
Aldin 
Male, 20, student 
• “After the war ended, we were refugees in Germany for three years, then came 
back to Sanski Most and had to build our house…again.” 
Damir 
Male, 52, former soldier 
• “I was in Prijedor [when the war began]. Serb soldiers and police officers 
separated men from women and children. Women and children were moved to 
refugee camps in a convoy…Men were killed. I only survived because I was 
lucky, and a woman hid me in her truck. Over 240 people in my convoy were 
killed…only five of those responsible have since been prosecuted.” 
• “I was shot twice during the war. Once in my head, the second time in my 
shoulder... Despite all this, I would do it again. It is a survival instinct- to fight 
back when you are attacked and humiliated.”   
• “I struggle with high blood pressure now. The doctors said my coronary system is 
in bad condition because of the constant adrenaline and stress I felt during the 
war. My heart couldn’t handle it.” 
Sabina 
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Female, 42, manager of a nursing home 
• “When I was at university in Sarajevo, I had a Serb friend who told me to go 
home to my family, because something bad was going to happen soon. She told 
me I had to flee, because in a few days, it would be chaos.  It started on Saturday, 
April 6, 1992- the first day of Ramadan.”  
• “After I fled from Sarajevo, I went to my grandmother’s house in Bosanski Novi. 
We heard that Serbs were taking Bosniak men from their houses. My 
grandmother asked her Serb neighbor to hide my father in her flat, because the 
soldiers weren’t knocking on Serb doors…she said yes, even though if Serbs had 
found out, she would have been killed. We were lucky.”  
• “Two Serb soldiers came to our door and asked if any Bosniak men lived there. 
Then one [of the soldiers] asked me to marry him. I was so scared; I was already 
lying about my father, and said no. They were in full uniform and had big guns.”  
• “When war happens, we have to escape to stay alive. Our life is the most 
precious thing we have, and there is no point in staying and dying. In war there 
are no rules…those who stay are killed.”  
• “The war changed everything…Destinies and lives. I could be somewhere else, I 
could have finished university in Sarajevo and been a doctor…But the war took 
what was supposed to be the best years of my life.” 
Ada 
Female, 50, manager of a soup kitchen 
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• “I think about the war often. My husband was in the Omarska concentration camp 
for four months. Every time I look at him I remember…we are living with these 
memories every day.” 
Djeno 
Male, 33, imam 
• “During the war, you cannot imagine how big the media blockade was. The Serbs 
were killing us and putting us in concentration camps…but the news said 
‘Muslims are killing each other,’ and even in schools, this is what kids learned.”  
• “We had a friend who worked in a news station during the war. After the war, 
Bosniaks called her a traitor for the lies she said on TV. When we met with her, 
she cried and said that they held a gun to her head and said they would kill her 
and her whole family if she did not read the news they gave her…This shows 
again how the war was very well planned and organized.”  
• “I spent one day in a concentration camp, but for me, that’s the place of the most 
suffering and humiliation for me and my family. Today, where the camp used to 
be [in a school] there is a monument for the Serb soldiers who died during the 
war. To put a monument for the perpetrators in front of the site were people were 
raped, where someone’s father or brother were killed…For me, this is one of the 
biggest barriers to reconciliation. It is also a kind of trauma trigger for me, 
because it is showing me that we [Bosniaks] are not welcome in RS.” 
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